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Contract Law and the Hand Formula 
Daniel P. O’Gorman* 
ABSTRACT 
Contract law is largely about negligence. Through the use of a 
“reason to know” or “reason to believe” standard in many of the 
black letter rules in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
contract liability can often be traced to a party’s failure to exercise 
reasonable care. The Restatement, however, fails to adequately 
explain when a person has reason to know or reason to believe 
something. In other words, despite being largely about careless 
behavior, contract law fails to adequately explain the standard of 
care expected of parties. Importantly, though, the Restatement at 
least makes clear that a person might have reason to know or 
reason to believe something even when a reasonable person would 
believe the probability of the fact’s existence (or future existence) 
is less than 50%, as long as the probability is sufficiently 
substantial. The Restatement does not, however, provide much 
guidance on when the probability should be considered sufficiently 
substantial. This Article proposes that negligence law’s Hand 
formula be applied to make this determination.  
INTRODUCTION 
Contract law is largely about negligence.1 Through the direct 
and indirect use of a “reason to know” or “reason to believe” 
standard in many of the black letter rules in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, contract liability can often be traced to a 
party’s failure to exercise reasonable care under the 
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 1. This Article uses the word negligence in the sense of behavior that falls 
below an acceptable level of care, as opposed to referring to a tort claim of 
negligence. See JOHN L. DIAMOND, UNDERSTANDING TORTS 46 (5th ed. 2013) 
(explaining the two different senses in which negligence is used); see also 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (9th ed. 2009) (defining negligence as “[t]he 
failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would 
have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal 
standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except 
for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others’ 
rights,” but also as “[a] tort grounded in this failure”). 
128 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
circumstances.2 The Restatement, however, fails to adequately 
explain when a person has reason to know or reason to believe 
something. In other words, despite being largely about careless 
behavior, contract law fails to adequately explain the standard of 
care expected of parties.  
This Article proposes that negligence law’s Hand formula3 be 
applied in contract law to determine whether a person has “reason 
to know” or “reason to believe” something. As will be shown, 
using the Hand formula explains the relevance of facts traditionally 
considered irrelevant under a contract-law analysis, but which 
intuitively seem relevant.  
Part I of this Article explains how contract law is largely about 
negligence. Part II discusses the Restatement’s “reason to know” 
and “reason to believe” standard and shows that the Restatement 
fails to adequately explain it. Part III discusses negligence law’s 
famous Hand formula. Part IV maintains that the Hand formula 
should be used to determine when a party is negligent under 
contract law’s “reason to know” and “reason to believe” standard. 
Part V provides examples, through the use of well-known cases, of 
how the Hand formula would apply in cases involving the 
standard.  
I. CONTRACT LAW AS A LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 
Although a bargain might usually involve each party 
intentionally assuming obligations,4 contract law, like tort law,5 is 
                                                                                                             
 2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2010) (providing that “[a] person acts negligently if the 
person does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances”). “Reason 
to know” would presumably apply when asking if a person had reason to know 
the existence of a current or past fact. “Reason to believe” would presumably 
apply when asking if a person had reason to believe that some fact would arise 
in the future. The Restatement, however, creates confusion by referring to 
“reason to know” of a fact, “present or future.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. b (1981). The Restatement uses the phrase “reason to 
understand” in Section 69 (acceptance by silence or exercise of dominion), but it 
is unclear whether such a standard differs in a meaningful way from “reason to 
know” or “reason to believe.” Id. § 69(1)(b). 
 3. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 
1947) (setting forth a formula for determining whether a person’s conduct fell 
below the appropriate standard of care for purposes of determining negligence 
liability in tort). 
 4. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 98 (11th ed. 2003) 
(defining bargain as “an agreement between parties settling what each gives or 
receives in a transaction between them or what course of action or policy each 
pursues in respect to the other”). 
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primarily about negligence. Such an assertion might be contrary to 
what is commonly assumed,6 but a survey of contract law’s black 
letter rules reveals its truth. 
For example, one need look no further than Section 2 of the 
Restatement for confirmation that contract law is primarily about 
negligence. Section 2 defines promise (the most important term in 
contract law)7 as “a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from 
acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in 
understanding that a commitment has been made.”8 A comment to 
Section 2 explains that the phrase “manifestation of intention” is 
used to make clear that a person need not intend to make a 
promise, provided she had “reason to believe” her words or actions 
would be interpreted as an intention to act or refrain from acting in 
a specified way.9 Also, the promisee must be justified in 
understanding that a commitment has been made.10 A promisee 
whose understanding is unjustified is at fault for having such an 
understanding and, in such a situation, the communication will not 
be considered a promise. Thus, the definition of promise 
incorporates a fault standard that applies to both the promisor and 
the promisee.11  
 The word manifestation, with its “reason to believe” fault 
standard, is repeated in the Restatement’s definition of 
agreement—“a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two  
 
                                                                                                             
 5. See DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 46 (“[N]egligence, as a form of fault-
based liability . . . continues to be the central basis for liability in most tort 
cases.”). 
 6. See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Lore, 27 J. CORP. L. 505, 510 (2002) 
(“The understood purpose of contract law is to facilitate people’s freely made 
private exchange transactions.”); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A 
THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2 (1981) (“Contract law ratifies and 
enforces our joint ventures . . . . [T]he law of contracts facilitates our disposing 
of [our] rights on terms that seem best to us.”); Patrick Atiyah, Contracts, 
Promises and the Law of Obligations, 94 L.Q. REV. 193 (1978), reprinted in A 
CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 78, 78 (Peter Linzer ed., 2d ed. 1995) (noting that 
contract law is usually considered to be based on voluntarily-assumed 
obligations). 
 7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (defining 
contract as “a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a 
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a 
duty”); see also FRIED, supra note 6, at 7–27 (arguing that contract law is 
primarily about the morality of promising). 
 8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 (1981) (emphasis added). 
 9. Id. § 2 cmt. b. 
 10. Id. § 2. 
 11. Id. (emphasis added). 
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or more persons”12—with a comment to the definition noting that 
“[t]he word contains no implication of mental agreement.”13 
Because an agreement is necessary for the formation of a 
bargained-for exchange contract, the word manifestation is 
repeated again when stating the requirements for the formation of 
such a contract: “the formation of a contract requires . . . 
manifestation of mutual assent.”14 A comment explains that 
manifestation is used to make clear that subjective intent to enter 
into a contract is unnecessary.15 Another rule provides that “[t]he 
conduct of a party may manifest assent even though he does not in 
fact assent.”16  
The definition of bargain also incorporates a fault standard. 
The definition is “an agreement to exchange promises or to 
exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange 
performances.”17 By directly incorporating agreement and 
promise, the definition of bargain indirectly incorporates both the 
“reason to believe” standard and the “justify” standard. And the 
Restatement further implements a fault-based regime by directly 
using a “reason to know” standard (or, in one instance, “reason to 
understand”)18 and by indirectly using a “reason to believe” 
standard through the use of the words manifestation, manifest, or 
manifested in numerous other restatements of black letter law.19 
The prevalence of contract law’s use of the “reason to know” 
and “reason to believe” standard is unsurprising because such a 
standard implements the so-called objective theory of contract, 
under which parties’ subjective intentions are usually irrelevant 
and the parties’ rights and duties are determined objectively—
based on what the parties manifested.20 As Judge Jerome Frank 
famously stated, “[t]he objectivists transferred from the field of 
torts [and into the field of contracts] that stubborn anti-subjectivist, 
the ‘reasonable man.’”21 And because of the prevalence of the 
                                                                                                             
 12. Id. § 3. 
 13. Id. § 3 cmt. a. 
 14. Id. § 17(1). 
 15. Id. § 17 cmt. c. 
 16. Id. § 19(3). 
 17. Id. § 3. 
 18. Id. § 69(1)(b). 
 19. See, e.g., id. §§ 2(1), 3, 7, 15(1)(b), 16, 19(2), 20(1), 20(2), 21, 24, 26, 
28(1), 28(2), 29, 38(1), 38(2), 39(1), 39(2), 42, 49, 50(1), 51, 53(3), 54(2), 56, 
69(1)(a), 93, 94, 96, 98, 102, 103, 104, 112, 221, 248, 266. 
 20. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 114–17 (4th ed. 2004) 
(explaining the distinction between the objective theory of contract and the 
subjective theory of contract). 
 21. Ricketts v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., 
concurring). 
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“reason to know” and “reason to believe” standard within contract 
doctrine, it is not an overstatement to say that contract law is 
primarily about sanctioning a party for negligent conduct—usually 
the negligent use of language. Thus, the principal distinction 
between contract law and tort law is not a distinction between 
voluntarily assumed duties and externally-imposed duties; it is a 
distinction based on the typical types of behavior that result in 
liability and the typical types of harm caused by such behavior. 
Contract law is primarily concerned with the negligent use of 
language that causes economic harm, whereas tort law is primarily 
concerned with negligent, non-verbal action that results in personal 
injury or property damage.  
Contract law’s focus on fault is not limited to contract 
formation. For example, the defenses for non-performance are 
largely about fault. The Statute of Frauds precludes a plaintiff from 
holding a defendant liable when the plaintiff failed to obtain 
written confirmation of the bargain.22 The defense of mistake 
excuses non-performance, but only if the mistaken party did not 
manifest an intention to bear the risk of the mistake, or should not, 
as a matter of law, bear the risk of the mistake.23 In other words, if 
the mistaken party led the other party to believe the mistaken party 
was assuming the risk of the mistake, the mistaken party is liable.24 
Even if the mistaken party did not lead the other party to believe 
this, if the mistaken party was grossly negligent in making the 
mistake, the mistaken party remains liable.25  
When a party induces another party to manifest assent by 
means of a misrepresentation, the victim is given the power to void 
the contract, essentially holding the misrepresenting party 
responsible for making the statement without confirming its 
truth.26 But the victim cannot avoid the contract based on the 
                                                                                                             
 22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1981). 
 23. Id. §§ 152, 153. 
 24. See id. § 154 (providing that “[a] party bears the risk of [the] mistake 
when the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties”). The standard to 
be applied in determining whether a party has agreed to bear the risk of the 
mistake is an objective standard. See id. § 154 cmt. b (“[H]e may . . . agree, by 
appropriate language or other manifestations, to perform in spite of mistake that 
would otherwise justify his avoidance.”); id. § 3 (defining agreement as “a 
manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons”); see, e.g., 
Wood v. Boynton, 25 N.W. 42 (Wis. 1885) (holding that seller of stone that 
turned out to be an uncut diamond bore the risk of mistake when she told the 
buyer that she did not know what the stone was). 
 25. Thrifty Payless, Inc. v. Americana at Brand, LLC, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
718, 729 (Ct. App. 2013).  
 26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981) (“If a 
party’s manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or a material 
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misrepresentation if the victim’s reliance on the misrepresentation 
was unjustified.27 This rule therefore adopts a contributory fault 
standard, though the required degree of fault by the victim is quite 
high.28 When a party induces a victim’s assent through duress or 
undue influence, the resulting contract is voidable by the victim, 
holding the party responsible for improperly obtaining assent.29 
For a contract or one of its terms to be unenforceable under the 
doctrine of unconscionability, there must be either unfair surprise 
or lack of meaningful choice resulting in oppressive terms,30 with 
the focus often on whether there has been bad behavior by one of 
the parties.31 The doctrines of impracticability and frustration of 
purpose do not excuse non-performance if the non-performing 
party’s own fault made performance impracticable or pointless.32 
With respect to damages, a party is not liable for losses that the 
non-breaching party could have avoided through reasonable 
efforts.33 Thus, contract law, like tort law, is dominated by 
doctrines in which fault is an element. 
Of course, an important distinction between contract law and 
tort law is that under contract law, when one uses language 
negligently and leads another to mistakenly believe a promise has 
been made—which, as shown above, is just one example of a fault 
standard in contract law—one can still avoid liability by 
performing as promised.34 But this does not meaningfully 
distinguish contract law from tort law, because performing as 
promised simply means no harm has been suffered by the 
promisee, and, similarly, under tort law there is no claim without 
harm.35 The promisor who negligently makes a promise but then 
                                                                                                             
 
misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in 
relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient.”). 
 27. See id. § 164 cmt. d. 
 28. See Cousineau v. Walker, 613 P.2d 608, 616 (Alaska 1980) (holding 
that recipient’s reliance is only unjustified if it was “irrational, preposterous, or 
in bad faith”). 
 29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175, 177 (1981). 
 30. See generally id. § 208. 
 31. See id. § 208 cmt. d. 
 32. See id. §§ 261 (impracticability), 265 (frustration of purpose). 
 33. See id. § 350 (avoidable loss doctrine). 
 34. See JP Morgan Chase v. J.H. Elec. of N.Y, Inc., 893 N.Y.S.2d 237 
(App. Div. 2010) (stating that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 
“the existence of a contract, the plaintiff's performance under the contract, the 
defendant’s breach of that contract, and resulting damages” (emphasis added)). 
 35. See Schuman v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 69 A.3d 512, 526–28 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 2013) (holding that a claim in negligence requires the plaintiff to 
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performs is simply a person whose conduct fell below the required 
standard of care and who then took action to keep his carelessness 
from causing harm.  
For example, consider a grocery store that fails to mop up 
rainwater that has accumulated just inside its front door on a rainy 
day and that also fails to put a wet-floor sign next to the water.36 
The store’s failure to mop up the water or display a wet-floor sign 
is conduct below the required standard of care under tort law.37 If a 
patron enters the store, reaches for a shopping buggy, and slips on 
the rainwater, injuring his neck and shoulders,38 the grocery store 
will be liable in tort for negligence.39 Assume, however, that the 
facts are slightly different: As the patron is falling, a grocery-store 
clerk, who happens to be standing next to the shopping buggies, 
catches the patron and neither the patron nor the clerk is harmed. 
The grocery store, despite its negligence, is not liable in tort 
because its negligence caused no harm. 
Now, consider an employer who, through its president’s 
negligent use of language, leads one of its employees to justifiably 
believe the employer and employee have entered into a contract for 
one year of re-employment.40 If the employer fires the employee 
two months later without just cause, the employer will be liable for 
breach of contract.41 These facts are not meaningfully different 
from the facts in the grocery store hypothetical in which the patron 
falls and is injured. Both the grocery store and the employer 
engaged in behavior that fell below the acceptable standard of care, 
causing harm to another person—the patron and the employee, 
respectively. The only difference is that the grocery store’s conduct 
involved the negligent failure to mop up the water or place a wet-
floor sign next to it, whereas the employer’s conduct involved the 
negligent use of language. 
Assume, however, that the employer, after becoming aware of 
its negligent use of language, retains the employee for one year. In 
such a case, the employer would not be liable for breach of 
contract despite its negligence because the employer performed its 
                                                                                                             
 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff was harmed by the 
defendant’s conduct, and finding that the plaintiff failed to carry that burden). 
 36. See, e.g., Burnett v. M & E Food Mart, Inc. # 2, 772 So. 2d 393 (La. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
 37. See id. at 397–98. 
 38. Id. at 395. 
 39. Id. at 397–98. 
 40. Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1907). 
 41. Id.  
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promise and thereby avoided causing any harm to the employee. 
These facts are really no different from the altered facts in the 
grocery store hypothetical. The employer retaining the employee 
for the promised year is like the grocery-store clerk catching the 
falling patron. No harm, no foul. 
 One might argue that a fundamental difference between 
contract law and tort law is that contract law requires an intentional 
act. In other words, one must voluntarily choose to use language 
before one can be held liable for its negligent use. As noted by the 
Restatement: “A ‘manifestation’ of assent is not a mere 
appearance; the party must in some way be responsible for the 
appearance. . . . This is true even though the other party reasonably 
believes that the assent is genuine.”42 But tort law usually also 
requires an antecedent intentional act, even when liability 
ultimately flows from a subsequent failure to act, such as the 
failure to mop up the rainwater or display a wet-floor sign next to 
it. One must open a grocery store and then invite patrons into the 
store before being liable for not mopping up the rainwater or 
placing a wet-floor sign next to it. Similarly, one must drive a car 
down the street before being liable for striking a pedestrian, and 
one must perform a surgical operation on a patient before being 
liable for making the patient’s condition worse. As noted by the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, even though negligence can involve a 
person failing to take a reasonable precaution, it is preferable to 
state that the person is negligent for engaging in an activity 
without taking reasonable precautions.43  
The general rule that tort law does not impose a duty to act 
shows that liability generally starts with an intentional act.44 
Although exceptions to this general rule have arisen, they can be 
traced to a voluntary act. For example, although real property 
owners have a duty to help guests and invitees,45 one must choose 
to become a real property owner and then invite the guest or 
invitee onto the property. Although the law imposes a duty upon a 
person to extricate another from danger if the person created the 
danger, the person must engage in conduct to create the danger.46  
It might be argued, however, that in contract law a person may 
intend to make a promise and then be prevented from performing 
as promised for reasons beyond the promisor’s control, and yet still 
                                                                                                             
 42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. c (1981) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 3 cmt. c (2010). 
 44. La Raia v. Super. Ct., 722 P.2d 286, 289 (Ariz. 1986). 
 45. Id. at 290. 
 46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 (1965). 
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be held liable. The Restatement notes: “Contract liability is strict 
liability. . . . The obligor is therefore liable in damages for breach 
of contract even if he is without fault and even if circumstances 
have made the contract more burdensome . . . than he had 
anticipated.”47  
Though, in such a situation, the promisor’s negligence is not 
the failure to perform as promised, the promisor’s negligence is the 
failure to have qualified the promise by the event that rendered 
performance impossible or more burdensome. As noted by the 
Restatement:  
The obligor who does not wish to undertake so extensive an 
obligation [strict liability] may contract for a lesser one by 
using one of a variety of common clauses: he may agree 
only to use his “best efforts”; he may restrict his obligation 
to his output or requirements; he may reserve a right to 
cancel the contract; he may use a flexible pricing 
arrangement such as a “cost plus” term; he may insert a 
force majeure clause; or he may limit his damages for 
breach.48 
Also, contract liability is not truly strict liability. Under the 
impracticability doctrine, a promisor who fails to perform as 
promised because her performance was rendered impossible or 
impracticable as a result of an unanticipated event that was not her 
fault will generally only be liable if the language she used when 
contracting manifested an intention to still be liable.49 Thus, 
liability (as opposed to the failure to perform) can still be traced to 
the promisor’s fault—having led the other party to believe that she 
would perform no matter what. 
The remedies under contract law and negligence law might 
suggest, however, that the two areas of law are fundamentally 
different. Under negligence law, the remedy is to return the 
plaintiff to the status quo ante.50 Under contract law, the remedy is 
to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the 
defendant performed as promised—so-called expectation damages 
                                                                                                             
 47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, intro. note (1981). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. § 261. 
 50. See Daniel Markovits, Making and Keeping Contracts, 92 VA. L. REV. 
1325, 1361 (2006) (“The ordinary morality of harm, embodied for example in 
the law of torts, is backward-looking. The obligations it contemplates . . . are 
limited to preventing losses; and the remedies it recommends (for example, the 
damage awards contemplated in the law of torts) are limited to the compensation 
necessary to restore the status quo ante.”). 
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or benefit-of-the-bargain damages.51 And this difference in 
remedies cannot be ignored because the expectation-damages rule 
is arguably “the distinctive hallmark of contract law.”52  
But Professor Lon Fuller famously, and persuasively, argued 
that contract law’s standard remedy of expectation damages might 
be designed to protect the promisee’s reliance on the promise, with 
expectation damages being awarded because reliance damages are 
often hard to prove and often the same as benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages.53 Fuller explained:  
[E]ven if our interest [in contract law] were confined to 
protecting promisees against an out-of-pocket loss, it would 
still be possible to justify the rule granting the value of the 
expectancy, both as a cure for, and as a prophylaxis against, 
losses of this sort.  
 
It is a cure for these losses in the sense that it offers the 
measure of recovery most likely to reimburse the plaintiff 
for the (often very numerous and very difficult to prove) 
individual acts and forbearances which make up his total 
reliance on the contract. It [sic] we take into account “gains 
prevented” by reliance, that is, losses involved in foregoing 
the opportunity to enter other contracts, the notion that the 
rule protecting the expectancy is adopted as the most 
effective means of compensating for detrimental reliance 
seems not at all far-fetched. Physicians with an extensive 
practice often charge their patients the full office call fee 
for broken appointments. Such a charge looks on the face 
of things like a claim to the promised fee; it seems to be 
based on the “expectation interest.” Yet the physician 
making the charge will quite justifiably regard it as 
compensation for the loss of the opportunity to gain a 
                                                                                                             
 51. See Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641, 644 (N.H. 1929) (holding that the 
general remedy for breach of contract is an amount of compensation designed to 
put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the defendant 
performed as promised, not an amount of compensation designed to put the 
plaintiff in the position he was in before the promise was made); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981) (“Subject to the limitations stated in §§ 
350-53, the injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest 
. . . .”); id. § 344(a) (defining “expectation interest” as the plaintiff’s “interest in 
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would 
have been in had the contract been performed”).  
 52. PETER BENSON, THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 2, 3 
(2001). 
 53. L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).  
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similar fee from a different patient. This foregoing of other 
opportunities is involved to some extent in entering most 
contracts, and the impossibility of subjecting this type of 
reliance to any kind of measurement may justify a 
categorical rule granting the value of the expectancy as the 
most effective way of compensating for such losses.54 
Fuller also argued that the justification for contract law’s 
expectation-damages rule need not be limited to curing and preventing 
reliance losses, but might be justified by “a policy in favor of 
promoting and facilitating reliance on business agreements.”55 Fuller 
then explained this policy in a way fully applicable to the policy 
behind negligence law:  
As in the case of the stop-light ordinance we are interested 
not only in preventing collisions but in speeding traffic. 
Agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or 
for society, unless they are made the basis for action. When 
business agreements are not only made but are also acted 
on, the division of labor is facilitated, goods find their way 
to the places where they are most needed, and economic 
activity is generally stimulated. These advantages would be 
threatened by any rule which limited legal protection to the 
reliance interest [i.e., damages to return the promisee to the 
status quo ante]. Such a rule would in practice tend to 
discourage reliance. The difficulties in proving reliance and 
subjecting it to pecuniary measurement are such that the 
business man knowing, or sensing, that these obstacles 
stood in the way of judicial relief would hesitate to rely on 
a promise in any case where the legal sanction was of 
significance to him. To encourage reliance we must 
therefore dispense with its proof. . . . The juristic 
explanation in its final form is then twofold. It rests the 
protection accorded the expectancy on (1) the need for 
curing and preventing the harms caused by reliance, and (2) 
on the need for facilitating reliance on business 
agreements.56 
In other words, the expectation-damages rule is arguably based not 
only on reimbursing the victim for harm caused, but also on 
encouraging reliance on bargains so as to promote efficiency. 
                                                                                                             
 54. Id. at 60. 
 55. Id. at 61. 
 56. Id. at 61–62. 
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If Fuller’s suggested rationales for expectation damages are 
accepted, they dissolve the apparent distinction between contract-
law remedies and tort-law remedies. Both are designed to 
compensate for harm caused to the plaintiff and to encourage 
persons to engage in useful activities by guaranteeing that others 
with whom they come into contact while engaging in those 
activities will be held liable if those others are negligent and cause 
harm.  
Whether contract law is primarily about fault or something 
else—such as autonomy or morality—has been a matter of 
contention over the past forty years.57 But the objective theory of 
contract, which has “predominated in the common law of contracts 
since time immemorial,”58 and the numerous uses of the “reason to 
know” and “reason to believe” standard in the black letter of 
contract law, lead to the inescapable conclusion that contract law’s 
core is largely about fault. Professor Charles Fried’s famous theory 
that contract law is primarily about the morality of keeping one’s 
promises59 crumbles under the objective theory of contract,60 
which provides that a person can be liable even if she did not 
intend to make a promise.61 Professor Randy Barnett’s similar 
theory that contract law is primarily about consent62 is not really 
about consent at all—as that term is commonly understood—
because his definition of consent includes an objective standard, 
referring to a “manifestation of an intention.”63 Recognizing that 
contract law is primarily about fault does not mean that contract 
law should be assimilated into tort law, and that every contract 
doctrine should be based on fault (and none based on autonomy or 
morality), any more than every tort doctrine is or should be based 
                                                                                                             
 57. For a discussion of the different theories of contract law, see Daniel P. 
O’Gorman, Contract Theory and Some Realism About Employee Covenant Not 
to Compete Cases, 65 SMU L. REV. 145, 157–77 (2012). 
 58. Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract 
Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 428 (2000). 
 59. See FRIED, supra note 6, at 1 (“The promise principle, which in this 
book I argue is the moral basis of contract law, is that principle by which 
persons may impose on themselves obligations where none existed before.”).  
 60. See Atiyah, supra note 6, at 84 (“Every law student is taught from his 
earliest days that contractual intent is not really what it seems; actual subjective 
intent is normally irrelevant. It is the appearance, the manifestation of intent that 
matters. Whenever a person is held bound by a promise or a contract contrary to 
his actual intent or understanding, it is plain that the liability is based not on 
some notion of voluntary assumption of obligation, but on something else.”). 
 61. FARNSWORTH, supra note 20, at 115. 
 62. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 269 (1986). 
 63. Id. at 304 (emphasis added). 
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on fault. It simply recognizes a fact: contract law, for the most part, 
is about fault. 
Despite contract law being primarily about fault, judges, 
lawyers, and scholars still use language referring to the parties’ 
intentions when describing it.64 Professor Robert Hillman has 
discussed this discrepancy and argued that it is the result of 
persons describing contract law as they wished it could be, rather 
than as it is and must be.65  
 Thus, judges, lawyers, and scholars have simply failed to accept 
the hard truth that contract law is primarily—even if not 
exclusively—about fault (and, in particular, about negligence). As 
a result, whereas courts and scholars have devoted considerable 
attention in tort law to exploring when a party will (or should) be 
considered to have acted below the applicable standard of care, 
courts and scholars have devoted much less attention to the same 
issue in contract law. It is time to move past the debate concerning 
what contract law is primarily about and recognize that it is 
primarily about fault and to focus the discussion on when a party 
is, in fact, at fault under contract law. 
II. CONTRACT LAW’S “REASON TO KNOW” AND “REASON TO 
BELIEVE” FAULT STANDARD  
This Part discusses contract law’s “reason to know” and 
“reason to believe” fault standard. As previously discussed, this 
standard is just one of the many ways in which contract law 
implements a fault-based regime. The standard of care in these 
other situations might be different from situation to situation, 
making it inappropriate to set forth a single fault standard for all of 
them. But the “reason to know” and “reason to believe” standard 
seems to have been incorporated throughout many of the 
Restatement’s black letter rules for the very purpose of having the 
same fault standard apply to each of those rules.  
A. An Important Innovation by the Standard 
An important innovation of the Restatement’s use of the 
“reason to know” and “reason to believe” standard with respect to 
communications is its focus, in many of the rules incorporating it, 
on what the speaker had reason to know or believe the recipient 
would infer, rather than on what the recipient had reason to know 
or believe. This was an innovation because courts traditionally 
                                                                                                             
 64. See Hillman, supra note 6, at 510–12. 
 65. Id. at 515–17 (internal citations omitted). 
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phrased black letter rules regarding communications as being 
based solely on what a reasonable person in the recipient’s 
position, or perhaps the position of a third-party observer, would 
infer from the communication.66 For example, a court in a well-
known case stated the following with respect to whether a 
communication was assent to a bargain or was just a joke: “[A] 
person cannot set up that he was merely jesting when his conduct 
and words would warrant a reasonable person in believing that he 
intended a real agreement.”67 Similarly, another court stated that 
determining whether an offer was made is based on “what an 
objective, reasonable person would have understood.”68 With 
respect to whether an offeree accepted an offer, one court in 
another well-known case stated that the test is whether “a 
reasonable man would believe that [the offeree] was assenting to 
the terms proposed by the other party.”69 
The Restatement’s “reason to know” and “reason to believe” 
standard often focuses on whether the speaker would have reason 
to know or believe that the recipient would infer a particular 
intention by the speaker.70 Of course, when the speaker is unaware 
of any characteristics of the recipient that the recipient does not 
share with the typical person, the speaker is justified in believing 
that the recipient does, in fact, have those characteristics.71 In such 
a situation, the speaker has reason to believe the recipient will 
construe the speaker’s words as a typical person would construe 
them. In that event, one can simply state the standard as how a 
typical person would construe the speaker’s words.  
But when the speaker knows or has reason to know that the 
recipient has characteristics that are different in kind or degree 
from the typical person, under the Restatement’s focus on the 
speaker he is held to a standard based on what he has reason to 
believe that particular recipient will infer from his 
                                                                                                             
 66. See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable 
Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 332 
(1997) (“The common law has generally framed its objective theory from the 
perspective of the promisee.” (emphasis added)). 
 67. Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954). 
 68. Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 116, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), 
aff’d, 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 69. Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 779 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1907) (quoting Smith v. Hughes, 6 L.R.Q.B. 597, 607 (1871)). 
 70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. b (1981). 
 71. Reference is made to the “typical” person because the “reasonable person” of 
tort law is arguably not the typical or average person. See DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 
49 & n.13 (“[T]he expected qualities of the reasonable person are not necessarily 
what is the average or even what most do in the community. . . . [T]he jury can, and 
probably often does, set a rather exacting standard of reasonableness.”). 
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communication. In other words, if the speaker is aware that the 
recipient is more gullible than the typical person, the speaker has 
reason to believe that what the typical person would construe as a 
joke the recipient might construe as serious. In such a situation, it 
might be appropriate to hold the speaker responsible, and the 
Restatement’s standard would permit such a result.72  
Also, focusing solely on the perspective of a typical person in 
the recipient’s position would not enable the court or jury to take 
into account whether the speaker had (or should have had) 
knowledge, or has intelligence, superior to that of a typical 
person.73 Under negligence law’s concept of the reasonable person, 
for example, “if a person in fact has knowledge, skill, or even 
intelligence superior to that of the ordinary person, the law will 
demand of that person conduct consistent with it.”74 Thus, to 
envision a single, typical person observing the transaction—
whether from the vantage of the recipient of the communication or 
a third party—is to ignore the fact that whether a person is at fault 
is based on the circumstances of that particular person, 
circumstances that might be different from the circumstances of 
the person sitting across the bargaining table or a person observing 
the transaction. 
B. The Restatement’s Failure to Adequately Explain the Standard 
Unfortunately, courts and commentators have neglected the 
contours of contract law’s “reason to know” and “reason to 
believe” standard. Perhaps this is because it is assumed that the 
standard is obvious—a person has reason to know or reason to 
believe something when a reasonable or typical person in the 
position of the party would believe that the fact’s existence (reason 
to know), or its chance of occurring (reason to believe), is more 
likely than not. This would be consistent with the burden of proof 
in most civil cases. As explained by one court: “[I]n most civil 
cases, the lowest, ordinary burden of proof applies, requiring what 
is commonly referred to as a ‘preponderance of the evidence.’ 
                                                                                                             
 72. See, e.g., THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, 
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 8 (6th ed. 2012) (Problem 2, 
involving a recipient of a communication whom the speaker knew had a low 
I.Q.). 
 73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. b (1981) (“A 
person of superior intelligence has reason to know a fact if he has information 
from which a person of his intelligence would draw the inference.”). 
 74. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 185 (5th ed. 
1984). 
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[Under this standard], the jury must be satisfied to a reasonable 
certainty by the greater weight of the credible evidence.”75 
Relying on the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to 
conclude that contract law’s “reason to know” and “reason to 
believe” standard is a more-likely-than-not-standard (i.e., a greater 
weight of the evidence standard) confuses, however, the quantum 
of proof necessary to establish “reason to know” or “reason to 
believe” with the substantive definition of “reason to know” and 
“reason to believe” (i.e., the amount of knowledge required).76 For 
example, a court could hold that a person is only considered to 
have reason to know a fact if a person would believe the chance of 
the fact existing was 70% or more, and yet still apply a 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to determine whether a 
person would believe there was a 70%-or-greater chance. In other 
words, evidence would have to be admitted to prove, more likely 
than not, that a person in the same position would have believed 
the chance of the fact existing was 70% or more. Accordingly, 
recognizing that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
applies in most civil cases does not help give meaning to the 
phrases “reason to know” and “reason to believe.” 
And neither does the phrase “reason to” provide much 
guidance on the applicable standard of care. The plain meaning of 
reason, as in “reason to act,” is “a rational ground or motive.”77 
Thus, applying the plain meaning of reason to the phrases “reason 
to know” and “reason to believe” means a “rational ground or 
motive to know” and a “rational ground or motive to believe.” 
Rational, however, is simply defined as “having reason or 
understanding.”78 Thus, consulting the plain meaning of “reason 
to” gets us nowhere. 
The Restatement, in a comment, provides a brief explanation of 
the “reason to know” and “reason to believe” standard.79 Perhaps 
                                                                                                             
 75. Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 815 N.W.2d 314, 324 (Wis. 
2012) (emphasis added). 
 76. See, e.g., NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401 (1983) 
(holding that even though the General Counsel has the burden of persuasion by a 
preponderance of the evidence, it was not improper for the NLRB to only 
require a showing that the employer’s anti-union animus was a factor in the 
decision); Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 680 (Col. 1998) (noting, with 
respect to punitive damages in employment-discrimination cases, the distinction 
between “what level of [defendant’s] intent must be established” and “the 
quantum of proof required to establish that substantive level of intent”).  
 77. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1037 (11th ed. 2003). 
 78. Id. at 1032. 
 79. Though the Restatement, in the comment, only expressly refers to 
“reason to know” and not to “reason to believe,” the comment applies to both 
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surprisingly, the Restatement indicates a person might have reason 
to know a fact exists (or will exist) even if a person would believe 
the chance of its existence (or future existence) is less than 50%, as 
long as there is a substantial chance it exists (or will exist): 
A person has reason to know a fact, present or future, if he 
has information from which a person of ordinary 
intelligence would infer that the fact in question does or 
will exist. A person of superior intelligence has reason to 
know a fact if he has information from which a person of 
his intelligence would draw that inference. There is also 
reason to know if the inference would be that there is such 
a substantial chance of the existence of the fact that, if 
exercising reasonable care with reference to the matter in 
question, the person would predicate his action upon the 
assumption of its possible existence. . . . [T]he words 
“reason to know” are used . . . where the actor . . . would 
not be acting adequately in the protection of his own 
interests were he not acting with reference to the facts 
which he has reason to know.80 
The comment states that a person has reason to know a fact when 
he would infer that it does exist, and then states there might also be 
reason to know where there is a substantial chance of its existence.  
 The fact that a 50%-or-less chance might be sufficiently 
substantial is supported by the statement that there is “reason to 
know” when “the actor . . . would not be acting adequately in the 
protection of his own interests were he not acting with reference to 
the facts which he has reason to know.” For example, assume a 
traveler has the choice of taking two different roads (Road A and 
Road B) to reach her destination, and the only difference between 
the roads is that Road B’s bridge crossing a river that cuts across 
both roads is out of commission 20% of the time, whereas Road 
A’s bridge is only out of commission 10% of the time. Also, 
assume that the traveler has no knowledge of whether either bridge 
is currently out of commission. The traveler would not be acting 
                                                                                                             
 
because it refers to having reason to know a fact “present or future.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. b (1981). 
 80. Id. (emphasis added). A similar standard has been adopted in Black’s 
Law Dictionary, which defines reason to know as follows: “Information from 
which a person of ordinary intelligence—or of the superior intelligence that the 
person may have—would infer that the fact in question exists or that there is a 
substantial enough chance of its existence that, if the person exercises 
reasonable care, the person can assume the fact exists.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1381 (9th ed. 2009). 
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adequately in the protection of her own interest if she took Road B 
instead of Road A, even though it is more likely than not that Road 
B’s bridge is working. 
The Restatement comment could have, of course, easily stated 
that a person has reason to know a fact exists (or will exist) when 
the person has reason to know its existence (or future existence) is 
more likely than not. Had such a standard been adopted, little 
explanation of the standard would be necessary. Such a standard 
might be difficult to apply in particular cases, but not because the 
standard itself is unclear. The Restatement, however, rejected such 
a standard, and instead used the vaguer “substantial chance” 
standard.  
Another Restatement comment makes clear that this substantial 
chance standard is a negligence standard, when it states the 
following:  
[E]ven though the intentional conduct of a party creates an 
appearance of assent on his part, he is not responsible for 
that appearance unless he knows or has reason to know that 
his conduct may cause the other party to understand that he 
assents. In effect there must be either intentional or 
negligent creation of an appearance of assent.81  
And another comment refers to the person exercising “reasonable 
care.”82 Professor Arthur Corbin similarly recognized that the 
objective theory of contract was a negligence theory: “In the 
process of making a contract, the actual and proved intent of either 
of the parties should not be disregarded, unless he knowingly or 
negligently has misled another person to his injury.”83  
Adopting a “substantial chance” or negligence standard instead 
of a more-likely-than-not standard has the benefit of being a more 
flexible standard, enabling a court or jury to reach a just result 
when it might not otherwise be able to do so. The detriment, 
however, is that the standard is more difficult to apply than a more-
likely-than-not standard, in turn making it more difficult for parties 
to predict how courts or juries will apply the standard to a given set 
of facts. In this sense, the choice between “substantial chance” or 
negligence and “more likely than not” is a choice between a so-
called standard—a vague, flexible test—and a so-called rule—a 
                                                                                                             
 81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. c (1981) (emphasis 
added). 
 82. Id. § 19 cmt. b. 
 83. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: ONE VOLUME EDITION § 
106, at 157 (1952) (emphasis added). 
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bright-line test—with each having the benefits and detriments of a 
standard or a rule, respectively.84 
The Restatement comment, despite adopting the “substantial 
chance” or negligence standard, gives little explanation of what 
constitutes a “substantial chance,” simply stating that the chance is 
sufficiently substantial when “the [reasonably careful] person 
would predicate his action upon the assumption of its possible 
existence”; then stating that there would be “reason to know” when 
the person “would not be acting adequately in the protection of his 
own interests were he not acting with reference to the facts which 
he has reason to know”; and then suggesting it is a negligence 
standard.85  
The Restatement’s “reason to know” and “reason to believe” 
standard was modeled on the “reason to know” standard in the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency and the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, and the definition of “notice” in the pre-2001 version of 
Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).86 The 
Restatement (Second) of Agency explains the standard as follows: 
A person has reason to know of a fact if he has information 
from which a person of ordinary intelligence, or of the 
superior intelligence which such person may have, would 
infer that the fact in question exists or that there is such a 
substantial chance of its existence that, if exercising 
reasonable care with reference to the matter in question, his 
action would be predicated upon the assumption of its 
possible existence. The inference drawn need not be that 
the fact exists; it is sufficient that the likelihood of its 
existence is so great that a person of ordinary intelligence, 
or of the superior intelligence which the person in question 
has, would, if exercising ordinary prudence under the 
circumstances, govern his conduct as if the fact existed, 
until he could ascertain its existence or non-existence. The 
words “reason to know” do not necessarily import the 
existence of a duty to others to ascertain facts; the words 
                                                                                                             
 84. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976) (“There are . . . two opposed 
modes for dealing with questions of the form in which legal solutions to the 
substantive problems should be cast. One formal mode favors the use of clearly 
defined, highly administrable, general rules; the other supports the use of 
equitable standards producing ad hoc decisions with relatively little precedential 
value.”). 
 85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. b (1981). 
 86. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9 (1958); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 (1965); U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (pre-2001 
version)). 
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are used both where the actor has a duty to another and 
where he would not be acting adequately in the protection 
of his own interests were he not to act with reference to the 
facts which he has reason to know. One may have reason to 
know a fact although he does not make the inference of its 
existence which would be made by a reasonable person in 
his position and with his knowledge, whether his failure to 
make such inference is due to inferior intelligence or to a 
failure properly to exercise such intelligence as he has. A 
person of superior intelligence or training has reason to 
know a fact if a person with his mental capacity and 
attainments would draw such an inference from the facts 
known to him. On the other hand, “reason to know” 
imports no duty to ascertain facts not to be deduced as 
inferences from facts already known; one has reason to 
know a fact only if a reasonable person in his position 
would infer such fact from other facts already known to 
him.87 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that: 
The words “reason to know” are used throughout the 
Restatement of this Subject to denote the fact that the actor 
has information from which a person of reasonable 
intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor 
would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such 
person would govern his conduct upon the assumption that 
such fact exists.88 
Thus, neither the Restatement (Second) of Agency nor the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts provides much information beyond that provided in 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  
 The Restatement (Second) of Agency comment does make 
clear, however, that a person can have “reason to know” even if he 
or she does not infer that the fact exists, and that the determination 
of whether a person has “reason to know” is based on the 
information in the person’s possession. The comments in each of 
the three Restatements also vary slightly with respect to the 
standard to which the person is held when the person has below 
average intelligence. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts refers 
to “a person of ordinary intelligence,” the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency refers not only to “a person of ordinary intelligence” but 
also “a reasonable person,” and the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
                                                                                                             
 87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 9 cmt. d (1958). 
 88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12(1) (1965). 
2014] CONTRACT LAW AND THE HAND FORMULA 147 
 
 
 
refers to a person of “reasonable intelligence.” It does not appear 
that these slightly different phrases are intended to be different 
standards, but because the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
refers to “a person of ordinary intelligence,” that is the phrase that 
will be used in this Article. 
Unfortunately, Article 1 of the U.C.C., which provides in its 
pre-2001 version that “[a] person has ‘notice’ of a fact when . . . he 
has reason to know that it exists,”89 does not provide any 
explanation of the standard in the Official Comment.90 
Accordingly, the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, and the pre-2001 version of Article 1 of the 
U.C.C., upon which the Restatement’s “reason to know” and 
“reason to believe” standard was based, do not provide any 
significant, additional information to help give greater meaning to 
the standard. 
Thus, for example, it remains unclear if “the person” in the 
Restatement comment is Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous “bad 
man,” who cares nothing about morality or causing harm to others 
and who acts only in self-interest.91 The comment indicates that the 
person would have “reason to know” if he “would not be acting 
adequately in the protection of his own interests were he not acting 
with reference to the fact,”92 but does not indicate that there are no 
other situations in which he would have reason to know. For 
example, is “the person” the reasonably careful person of tort law, 
who, unlike Holmes’s bad man, takes into consideration the harm 
his or her actions might cause to others93 and who is arguably more 
careful than the typical person?94 And does the “substantial 
chance” standard vary based upon the particular contract doctrine 
                                                                                                             
 89. U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (pre-2001 version). 
 90. See U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 25 (failing to explain when a person “has 
reason to know that [a fact] exists”). 
 91. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 
457, 459 (1897) (describing a bad man as “[a] man who cares nothing for an 
ethical rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors,” and who cares 
only about the material consequences to himself of his actions). 
 92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. b (1981) (emphasis 
added). 
 93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. b (1965) (“The 
words ‘reasonable man’ denote a person exercising those qualities of attention, 
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its members for 
the protection of their own interests and the interests of others.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 94. See DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 49 & n.13 (“[T]he expected qualities of 
the reasonable person are not necessarily what is the average or even what most 
do in the community. . . . [T]he jury can, and probably often does, set a rather 
exacting standard of reasonableness.”). 
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being applied, or is it a one-size-fits-all standard? No answers are 
provided. In other words, the Restatement takes the position that 
the “reason to know” and “reason to believe” standard is a 
negligence standard, but provides little guidance on applying it.95 
Presumably, under the Restatement, a party always has reason 
to know or reason to believe as long as a person of ordinary 
intelligence (or the superior intelligence of the party) in the party’s 
position (i.e., having the same information) would believe there 
was a greater-than-50% chance that something exists or will exist. 
This can be gleaned from the comment’s statement that there is 
reason to know if the person “has information from which a person 
of ordinary intelligence would infer that the fact in question does 
or will exist.”96  
C. Is the Standard Consistent with Neoclassical Contract Law? 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has been described as 
embodying the rules of neoclassical contract law,97 as opposed to 
the rules of classical contract law that were embodied in the 
Restatement (First) of Contracts.98 Professor Grant Gilmore argued 
that classical contract law’s rules made it difficult to form a 
contract and difficult to get out of one, whereas neoclassical 
contract law made it easier to form a contract and easier to get out 
of one.99 As Gilmore noted, “[e]vidently a free and easy approach 
to the problem of contract formation goes hand in hand with a free 
and easy approach to the problem of contract dissolution or 
                                                                                                             
 95. Professor Farnsworth, one of the Reporters for the Restatement, includes 
a brief discussion of the “reason to know” standard in his hornbook, but he 
provides little explanation of the standard, other than to indicate that it is about 
fault. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 20, at 449. Farnsworth was not, however, 
the Reporter when the Restatement’s “reason to know” comment was prepared. 
See Foreword to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981). Professor 
Robert Braucher, the Reporter at the time the comment was prepared, wrote an 
article discussing offer and acceptance in the Restatement, but the article 
provides no guidance on what “reason to know” or “reason to believe” means. 
See Robert Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE 
L.J. 302 (1964). 
 96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 cmt. b (1981). 
 97. See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. 
L. REV. 737, 738 (2000) (“Neoclassical contract law—the law of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts . . . .”). 
 98. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic 
Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. 
U. L. REV. 854, 855 n.2 (1978) (“Classical contract law refers . . . to that 
developed in the 19th century and brought to its pinnacle . . . in the 
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (1932).”). 
 99. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).  
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excuse—and vice versa.”100 Professor Duncan Kennedy has 
explained that rules that make it difficult to form a contract and 
difficult to get out of one are based on notions of individualism, 
whereas rules that make it easy to form a contract and easy to get 
out of one are based on notions of altruism: 
The individualist position is the restriction of obligations of 
sharing and sacrifice. This means being opposed to the 
broadening, intensifying and extension of liability and 
opposed to the liberalization of excuses once duty is 
established. This position is only superficially paradoxical. 
The contraction of initial liability leaves greater areas for 
people to behave in a self-interested fashion. Liberal rules 
of excuse have the opposite effect: they oblige the 
beneficiary of a duty to share the losses of the obligor when 
for some reason he is unable to perform. The altruist 
position is the expansion of the network of liability and also 
the liberalization of excuses.101 
Additionally, neoclassical contract law favored standards over 
rules.102 
Whether the Restatement’s use of the “substantial chance” or 
negligence standard is consistent with the generally recognized 
characteristics of neoclassical contract law depends on how the 
standard is applied. The “substantial chance” or negligence 
standard—which permits a finding that a person had “reason to 
know” or “reason to believe” a fact even if a person would believe 
its existence (or future existence) was less than 50%—will result in 
more contracts being formed if the standard applies to knowing a 
fact necessary to form a contract, but would result in fewer 
contracts being formed if it applies to knowing a fact that prevents 
formation. Characterizing the Restatement’s use of the “reason to 
know” and “reason to believe” standard as consistent with 
neoclassical contract law is difficult, however, because sometimes 
the standard is used with respect to a fact necessary to form a 
contract and at other times with respect to a fact that defeats 
formation.  
For example, the definition of offer incorporates the “reason to 
believe” standard through the phrase “manifestation of willingness 
                                                                                                             
 100. Id. at 48. 
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 102. See James W. Fox Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic 
Citizenship, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003) (“[W]here classical contract 
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to enter into a bargain.”103 The indirect use of the “reason to 
believe” standard increases the number of communications that 
will be offers because the standard is met as long as there was a 
substantial-enough chance that the offeree would believe that the 
offeror was willing to enter into a bargain.  
But the second clause of the definition of offer requires that the 
offeree be justified in understanding that his assent will conclude a 
bargain without further action by the offeror.104 And a subsequent 
rule makes clear that the offeree is unjustified in believing that the 
offeror intends to conclude a bargain without further action by the 
offeror if the offeree “knows or has reason to know that the person 
making [the communication] does not intend to conclude a bargain 
until he has made a further manifestation of assent.”105 Thus, as 
long as a person in the offeree’s position would have believed that 
there was a substantial-enough chance that the offeror did not 
intend to conclude a bargain until making a further manifestation 
of assent, the communication is not an offer, even if it was a 
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain.  
Accordingly, the first requirement of an offer applies the 
“reason to believe” standard to a fact necessary to form a contract, 
but the second requirement applies the “reason to know” standard 
to a fact that prevents formation. Thus, it is difficult to characterize 
the Restatement’s definition of offer as either classical or 
neoclassical; it is a bit of both.106 
                                                                                                             
 103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. § 26 (emphasis added). 
 106. The definition of promise, like the definition of offer, incorporates the 
“justify” standard. A promise is defined as “a manifestation of intention to act or 
refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in 
understanding that a commitment has been made.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981) (emphasis added). If there was a manifestation of 
intention to act in a specified way, whether a promise was made would then 
depend on whether the recipient was justified in assuming the statement of 
intention was also a commitment. Whether this “justify” standard within the 
definition of promise adopts a “reason to know” standard similar to that in the 
offer context, such that a promisee is not justified in understanding that a 
commitment has been made if the promisee had reason to know the promisor did 
not intend to make a commitment, is unclear. Arguably, a promisee could be 
justified in understanding that a commitment has been made as long as there was 
reason to know that the promisor was intending to make a commitment. (The 
“reason to believe” standard must be used in the latter formulation of the test 
because it must be assumed that the promisee misconstrued the promisor’s 
intention.) Unlike the Restatement’s treatment of offer, with its more specific 
rule making clear that an offeree is not justified in understanding an offer has 
been made if there is reason to know the offeror did not intend to conclude a 
bargain without making a further manifestation of assent, there is no such 
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Perhaps the most interesting use of the “reason to know” 
standard is with respect to contract interpretation in a case 
involving a misunderstanding of a term. Under the Restatement’s 
rule of interpretation, a party is not bound by the meaning attached 
by the other party to a term unless the first party had a greater level 
of fault regarding the misunderstanding, with there being two 
different fault levels—the higher degree is when the party knew 
the other party attached a different meaning to the term, and the 
lower degree is when the party had reason to know that the other 
party attached a different meaning to the term.107 If the parties had 
a material misunderstanding regarding a term and the level of fault 
between the parties was equal, or neither party was at fault because 
neither knew nor had reason to know the meaning attached by the 
other, there was no manifestation of mutual assent and hence no 
contract was formed.108 The latter rule is often called the Peerless 
doctrine after the famous English case—Raffles v. Wichelhaus—in 
which there was a misunderstanding about which ship the parties 
intended in a contract for the sale of cotton to be shipped “ex 
Peerless.”109 
It is commonly believed that this rule of interpretation involves 
determining which party was more at fault for the misunderstanding 
                                                                                                             
 
specific rule regarding promise to explain when a promisee is justified in 
understanding that a commitment has been made. This “justify” standard is not 
explained in the Restatement comment on promise, other than providing one 
example of when a promisee would not be justified in believing that a 
commitment has been made. See id. § 2 cmt. e (“Even if a present intention is 
manifested, the reservation of an option to change that intention means that there 
can be no promisee who is justified in an expectation of performance.”). The 
plain meaning of justify is “to prove or show to be just, right, or reasonable.” 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 680 (11th ed. 2003). The word 
just is not helpful because it simply begs the question. If the word right is used, 
then it would seem that the promisee or offeree is only justified if it turns out 
that the promisor did, in fact, intend to make a commitment, which would be 
inconsistent with the objective theory of contract. The word reasonable 
therefore seems to be the best fit for giving meaning to justify as that word is 
used in the definition of promise. This would mean that a promisee is justified in 
understanding that a commitment has been made as long as such an 
understanding was reasonable. And reasonable simply means “not extreme or 
excessive.” Id. at 1037. Ultimately, however, the Restatement leaves it unclear 
whether the “justify” standard in the definition of promise adopts a standard that 
asks whether the promisee had reason to know the offeror was not intending to 
make a commitment, or that asks whether the promisee had reason to know the 
offeror was intending to make a commitment. 
 107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981). 
 108. Id. § 20(1). 
 109. (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (K.B.); 2 Hurl. & C. 906. 
152 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
over the meaning of a particular term, with fault being assessed 
comparatively on a continuum. Professor William Young wrote, “if 
neither [party] is chargeable with carelessness, or one not more than 
the other, then there is no contract.”110 Judge Richard Posner 
explained the holding in Raffles as follows: “As there was no basis 
for thinking either party’s mistake more careless than the other 
party’s—or, stated differently, no reason to think one party’s 
understanding of the contract more reasonable than the other’s—
the court held there was no contract.”111 Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
famous discussion of the Peerless doctrine seemingly adopts this 
comparative fault standard, noting that if there was only one ship 
Peerless and the buyer had intended to say “Peri” but instead said 
“Peerless,” “he would have been bound.”112 If this explanation of 
the rules of interpretation is correct, the misunderstanding doctrine 
is consistent with neoclassical contract law because few 
misunderstandings will involve two plausible meanings that are 
equally reasonable. Thus, few bargains will fail to become 
contracts under the Peerless doctrine. 
The Restatement, however, by incorporating the “reason to 
know” standard adopts a contributory-fault standard, not a 
comparative-fault standard. The Restatement provides that there is 
no manifestation of mutual assent if each party had “reason to 
know” of the meaning attached by the other party.113 As previously 
explained, under the Restatement, a party has reason to know of a 
fact not only if the party has reason to know that it is more likely 
than not that the fact exists, but also “if the inference would be that 
there is such a substantial chance of the existence of the fact that, 
if exercising reasonable care with reference to the matter in 
question, the person would predicate his action upon the 
assumption of its possible existence.”114 
The distinction between the Restatement’s contributory-fault 
standard and a comparative-fault standard can be illustrated by the 
issue in Raffles, using Holmes’s example as a twist on the facts. In 
Raffles the parties entered into a contract for the sale of cotton to 
                                                                                                             
 110. William F. Young Jr., Equivocation in the Making of Agreements, 64 
COLUM. L. REV. 619, 630 (1964) (emphasis added). 
 111. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 104 (6th ed. 
2003) (emphasis added). 
 112. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 242 (Little, Brown 
& Co. 1881) (1963). 
 113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 20(1) (1981) (providing 
that “[t]here is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties 
attach materially different meanings to their manifestations and . . . each party 
has reason to know the meaning attached by the other”). 
 114. Id. § 19 cmt. b (emphasis added). 
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arrive at Liverpool “ex Peerless” from Bombay.115 The cotton 
arrived at Liverpool on a ship named Peerless, but the buyer 
refused to accept or pay for it.116 When the seller sued the buyer 
for breach of contract, the buyer argued that he had intended the 
cotton to arrive on a ship named Peerless that sailed from Bombay 
in October, but the cotton arrived on a different ship named 
Peerless that sailed from Bombay in December.117 The seller 
demurred to the buyer’s plea, thus admitting that the parties had 
each intended a different ship named Peerless.118 When the buyer 
argued that “there was no consenus [sic] ad idem, and therefore no 
binding contract,” he was immediately stopped by the court, which 
declared that there must be a judgment for the buyer.119 
Now, unlike the actual facts, assume that there is just one ship 
named Peerless and another ship named Pierless.120 The buyer, 
unfamiliar with the shipping industry, knows only of the ship 
named Pierless, but the seller, familiar with the shipping industry, 
knows of both ships. The seller knows that 20% of the written 
references by persons to Peerless are intended to be references to 
Pierless. The buyer and seller enter into a written agreement for 
the sale of cotton from Bombay “ex Peerless.” The buyer intends 
the reference to be to the ship Pierless, which is leaving Bombay 
in October, and the seller intends the reference to be to the ship 
Peerless, which is leaving Bombay in December. Neither party, 
however, knows of the different meaning attached by the other. 
Has there been a manifestation of mutual assent? 
Under the Restatement’s contributory-fault standard, the issue 
would be whether either or both of the parties were at fault for the 
misunderstanding and, if so, whether one was more at fault, but 
only two degrees of fault would be used—“know” and “reason to 
know” of the misunderstanding.121 The buyer had reason to know 
that the seller intended the reference to be to the ship Peerless, 
even though he did not know of that ship. Most persons use words 
correctly, not incorrectly, and the written agreement referred to 
Peerless. Thus, he had information from which a person of 
ordinary intelligence would infer that the seller intended a ship 
different from the Pierless. As previously noted, Holmes believed 
the case would end here, with the meaning of Peerless, as used in 
the written agreement, meaning the ship Peerless. But under the 
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Restatement’s “substantial chance” or negligence standard, the 
seller might have had reason to know that the buyer intended the 
reference to Peerless be to the ship Pierless. A 20% chance might 
be substantial enough to conclude that the seller had reason to 
know of the misunderstanding. 
The “reason to know” contributory-negligence standard for 
interpretation therefore results in the formation of fewer contracts 
than under a comparative-negligence standard. Thus, the use of 
this standard is inconsistent with neoclassical contract law’s 
emphasis on finding that a contract was formed. Whether this 
result was intended or even recognized by the drafters of the 
Restatement is unclear. 
Accordingly, it is difficult to characterize the Restatement’s use 
of the “reason to know” and “reason to believe” standard as either 
consistent or inconsistent with neoclassical contract law as a 
general matter. It will depend on how the standard is used in a 
particular black letter rule. The “substantial chance” or negligence 
standard is, however, at least consistent with neoclassical contract 
law’s emphasis on standards over rules. 
III. THE HAND FORMULA 
Unlike contract law, tort law has devoted considerable 
attention to defining negligence. Under tort law, “[a] person acts 
negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under 
all the circumstances.”122 And “[b]ecause a ‘reasonably careful 
person’ (or a ‘reasonably prudent person’) is one who acts with 
reasonable care, the ‘reasonable care’ standard for negligence [in 
tort law] is basically the same as a standard expressed in terms of 
the ‘reasonably careful person’ (or the ‘reasonably prudent 
person’).”123 Oliver Wendell Holmes explained the rationale 
behind tort law’s reasonably careful person standard: 
[W]hen men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a 
sacrifice of individual peculiarities going beyond a certain 
point, is necessary to the general welfare. If, for instance, a 
man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents 
and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his 
congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of 
Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his 
neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His 
                                                                                                             
 122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 3 (2010). 
 123. Id. § 3 cmt. a. 
2014] CONTRACT LAW AND THE HAND FORMULA 155 
 
 
 
neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come 
up to their standard, and the courts which they establish 
decline to take his personal equation into account. . . . The law 
considers, in other words, what would be blameworthy in the 
average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, 
and determines liability by that. If we fall below the level in 
those gifts, it is our misfortune; so much as that we must have 
at our peril, for the reasons just given.”124 
Under negligence law, a person is not liable simply because 
she engages in conduct that creates a risk of harm to others, 
because “[a]ll conduct creates some risk.”125 Rather, a person is 
only liable for conduct that involves “unreasonable risk creation,” 
i.e., “risks that a reasonable person would not [create].”126 Limiting 
liability to harm caused through negligence is justified on the 
ground that it is unjust to hold someone liable for non-negligently 
caused harm, and on the ground that such a limitation will lead to 
the efficient level of accidents and precautions.127 
Despite Holmes’s reference to the “average man,” tort law’s 
reasonably careful person “is not [in fact] to be identified with any 
ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable 
things; he is a prudent and careful person, who is always up to 
standard.”128 As explained by the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
In cases in which the actor allegedly is negligent for not 
having adverted to the risk, the jury might determine that 
the reasonably careful person would advert to this risk nine 
times out of 10. Such a determination acknowledges that 
such an actor would not notice the risk one time out of 10. 
The function of the jury is to consider what the reasonably 
careful person would have done in the particular factual 
situation, not what that person would do over an extended 
period of time. Hence, if the probability is 90 percent that 
the reasonably careful person would have adverted to the 
particular risk, a finding that the actor was negligent is 
obligatory. Because the jury focuses on the conduct of the 
reasonably careful person in each particular case, the 
fallibility of average persons over a period of time is a 
reality the jury is not in a position to consider. Accordingly, 
tort law’s case-by-case focus makes it appropriate to say 
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that the reasonably careful person is infallible in a way that 
ordinary people are not.129 
To determine whether a person’s conduct has created an 
unreasonable risk of harm—and thus a risk that the reasonably 
careful person would not take—Judge Learned Hand, in United 
States v. Carroll Towing Co., famously identified three factors to 
consider: the probability of harm; the gravity of the harm; and the 
burden of taking adequate precautions.130 He then provided what 
came to be known as the Hand formula for determining whether a 
person acted negligently: “[I]f the probability be called P; the 
injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is 
less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL.”131 Thus, 
“[t]he Hand Formula posits that a reasonable person balances costs 
and benefits in light of prevailing values in matters of safety and 
safety costs.”132 When a person’s action causes more harm than 
good, there are squandered resources, and moral indignation might 
be justified.133 In such a situation the actor should pay for the harm 
done, provided that it was foreseeable that the harm would 
outweigh the benefit. But when a person’s action, or inaction, 
results in greater benefit than harm, and thus results in an overall 
benefit to society, there is no such moral indignation and “no 
occasion to condemn the defendant.”134 The Hand formula is 
therefore correctly considered to be primarily utilitarian.135  
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The Hand formula has been endorsed by the American Law 
Institute, “by the leading treatises, and by courts in most states.”136 For 
example, the Restatement (Third) of Torts provides: “Primary factors 
to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct lacks 
reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s 
conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that 
may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the 
risk of harm.”137  
The Restatement (Third) of Torts recognizes that these are just 
factors, and “in particular categories of cases the inquiry into 
reasonable care, or the conduct of the reasonably prudent person, 
requires attention to considerations or circumstances that supplement 
or somewhat subordinate the primary factors.”138 The Restatement 
(Third) of Torts indicates that the primary factors are most relevant 
when the actor is aware of some risk but is willing to tolerate the risk 
because of the burden of preventing it.139 When the actor fails to 
recognize a risk, “explicit consideration of the primary factors is often 
awkward, and the actor’s conduct can best be evaluated by directly 
applying the standard of the reasonably careful person.”140 
                                                                                                             
 
to ignore the benefits obtained by an actor engaging in conduct that is frowned 
upon by society. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. h (2010) (“In most circumstances, negligence law 
takes into account and credits whatever burdens of risk prevention are actually 
experienced by the actor and others. While negligence law is concerned with 
social interests, courts regularly consider private interests, both because society 
is the protector of private interests and because the general public good is 
promoted by the protection and advancement of private interests. Nevertheless, 
in certain negligence cases there may be burdens of risk prevention that courts 
properly discount or decline to acknowledge. For example, certain motorists—
though hoping for and expecting a favorable outcome—may find it exciting to 
race a railroad train toward a highway crossing. Yet because society may not 
recognize that excitement as appropriate, it may be ignored by the jury in 
considering whether the motorist should have driven more conservatively.”). 
 136. Gilles, supra note 132, at 1015–16. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. d, reporter’s note 
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indeed present as a central case Judge Hand’s opinion in United States v. Carroll 
Towing Co. . . . A balancing approach to negligence has been accepted in 
judicial opinions in a large majority of jurisdictions. . . . Overall . . . a large 
number of judicial opinions support the balancing approach to negligence . . . .” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 3 (2010).  
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The Hand formula’s burden factor takes into account not only the 
cost of precautions but also the benefits to be expected from the risky 
behavior.141 Thus, determining the burden is multi-faceted, requiring 
“consideration of such things as the costs associated with avoiding the 
harm, alternatives and their feasibility, the inconvenience to those 
involved, and the extent to which society values the relevant 
activity.”142 The burden includes “endeavoring to gather more 
information before engaging in conduct, and also the burden the actor 
would have borne in making such an effort.”143  
Once the degree of burden is established, the foreseeable 
likelihood of harm must be multiplied by the foreseeable gravity of 
harm that might occur.144 Even if the foreseeable likelihood of 
harm is small, negligence can be found if the foreseeable gravity of 
the harm is large and the burden of taking adequate precautions is 
slight.145 With respect to the foreseeable likelihood of harm, it 
must have been foreseeable at the time of the conduct.146 And with 
respect to the foreseeable gravity of the harm, it is not the harm 
actually suffered by the plaintiff, but any harm that was 
foreseeable at the time of the conduct.147 
Because quantifying the various factors in the Hand formula 
will often be difficult in specific cases, the formula is not one that 
“generates determinative results.”148 It does, however, identify 
important factors to consider in deciding whether the actor was 
negligent.149 
IV. WHY THE HAND FORMULA SHOULD APPLY TO CONTRACT 
LAW’S “REASON TO KNOW” AND “REASON TO BELIEVE” STANDARD 
Accepting the Restatement’s use of the “reason to know” and 
“reason to believe” standard, and accepting the Restatement’s 
position that the standard is a negligence standard that might find 
                                                                                                             
 141. Id. 
 142. DIAMOND, supra note 1, at 65. 
 143. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 3 cmt. g (2010). 
 144. See id. § 3 cmt. e (“Conduct is negligent if its disadvantages outweigh 
its advantages, while conduct is not negligent if its advantages outweigh its 
disadvantages. The disadvantage in question is the magnitude of risk that the 
conduct occasions . . . . [T]he phrase ‘magnitude of risk’ includes both the 
foreseeable likelihood of harm and the foreseeable severity of the harm that 
might ensue.”). 
 145. Id. § 3 cmt. f. 
 146. Id. § 3 cmt. g. 
 147. Id. § 3 cmt. h. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
2014] CONTRACT LAW AND THE HAND FORMULA 159 
 
 
 
there was “reason to know” or “reason to believe” even when a 
person would believe the chance of a particular fact existing 
(currently or in the future) is less than 50%,150 the Hand formula 
should apply to the standard for several reasons. 
First, because the “reason to know” and “reason to believe” 
standard is vague, a test to give it greater definition would be 
useful. And because the standard is so prevalent throughout 
contract doctrines, providing greater definition to it is particularly 
important.  
Second, the Restatement articulates a negligence standard, and 
the Hand formula is well established in law as the standard for 
determining whether a person has acted negligently.151 Applying 
the Hand formula to contract law’s “reason to know” and “reason 
to believe” standard would therefore help promote uniformity in 
the law.  
Third, the Hand formula’s utilitarian approach is arguably 
more suitable for contract law than tort law because contract law is 
primarily about facilitating exchange,152 whereas tort law is largely 
about preventing physical harm. Thus, any moral objection to the 
Hand formula’s utilitarian approach has less weight with respect to 
contract law.  
Fourth, as will be shown in the next Part through an application 
of the Hand formula to several contract-law doctrines, the factors 
considered under the Hand formula are factors that intuitively 
appear relevant to contract-law cases, but which would be ignored 
under a traditional contract-law analysis. Applying the Hand 
formula would therefore make contract law more consistent with 
generally held notions of morality, which in turn would make 
contract law more legitimate to the public. 
Fifth, use of the Hand formula will incorporate a consideration 
of the foreseeable loss to the other party, and not simply focus on 
the self-interest of the actor (like Holmes’s bad man). This will 
increase overall societal welfare. 
Sixth, because the Hand formula takes into account the burden 
(or lack thereof) of taking adequate precautions, parties will not 
only be judged by the information they have, but the information 
that is readily available to them.  
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 An anticipated objection to applying the Hand formula to the 
“reason to know” and “reason to believe” standard is that it will 
unnecessarily complicate the analysis of contract-law issues, and 
that its frequent inability to provide determinative results makes it 
not worth the effort. But the Restatement’s “substantial chance” or 
negligence test for the “reason to know” and “reason to believe” 
standard has already complicated contract law and has made it 
difficult to provide determinative results to contract-law issues. 
The question is not whether the Hand formula is easy to apply or 
whether it provides determinative results in most cases; the 
question is whether applying the Hand formula will make a vague 
standard easier to apply and provide determinative results in more 
cases than applying the vague standard without it. And the answer 
to these questions is “yes.” Greater definition is better than less 
definition. 
V. APPLYING THE HAND FORMULA TO CONTRACT DOCTRINES 
This Part explains how the Hand formula would apply in 
contract law, and then applies the formula to various black letter 
rules incorporating the “reason to know” and “reason to believe” 
standard, either directly through the use of the former phrase or 
indirectly through the use of the words manifestation, manifest, or 
manifested. For many of the black letter rules discussed, a well-
known case will be used to illustrate how the Hand formula would 
apply. Because the Hand formula often does not provide 
determinative results, and because reasonable persons will often 
disagree on how the primary factors apply, this Part’s principal 
purpose is not to show what the correct result should be in each 
case. Rather, its principal purpose is to show a new way of 
applying established contract doctrines. 
A. B, P, & L in Contract Law 
As previously discussed, under the Hand formula, the 
defendant was not negligent if the burden of avoiding the loss (B) 
was greater than the probability of foreseeable loss (P) multiplied 
by the foreseeable gravity of the loss (L). In contrast, the defendant 
was negligent if the burden of avoiding the loss (B) was less than 
the probability of foreseeable loss (P) multiplied by the foreseeable 
gravity of the loss (L). Thus, B > PL = not negligent; B < PL = 
negligent. 
 Before applying the Hand formula to contract-law doctrines, 
one must identify that to which B, P, and L refer in a contract 
setting. The Hand formula, when applied in contract law, would 
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focus on a party predicating his or her action upon the assumption 
of a fact’s non-existence when the chance of its existence is 
somewhere between 1% and 50%. If the chance is greater than 
50%, the party is conclusively presumed to have reason to know of 
its existence (or reason to believe of its future existence) and the 
Hand formula would not apply, and if it is 0%, there is no reason to 
know or reason to believe because there is no possibility of its 
existence. L would refer to the foreseeable loss when the party 
predicates his or her action upon the assumption of the fact’s non-
existence or its future existence and it turns out that the fact exists 
or comes into existence. P refers to the foreseeable probability that 
the party’s assumption is incorrect and the fact exists or comes into 
existence—between 1% and 50%, depending on the circumstances. 
B refers to the burden of avoiding the foreseeable loss.
 Although the referents might vary based upon the particular 
contract doctrine being considered, when the rule involves a 
communication, L will often refer to the foreseeable loss caused by 
the speaker using language carelessly. Such harm will usually take 
the form of reliance by the recipient based on the belief that the 
speaker intends to act in a particular way, when the actor in fact 
intends to act in another way or not act at all. P will usually refer to 
the foreseeable likelihood that the recipient of the communication 
will misconstrue the speaker’s intentions. B will usually refer to 
the amount of effort it would have taken for the speaker to have 
used her language in a way that would have avoided the 
misunderstanding, or to have taken other action to avoid the harm 
caused by the misunderstanding—such as acquiring additional 
information before speaking. But, as previously noted, the 
referents will differ based on the particular contract doctrine under 
consideration.  
B. Applying the Hand Formula to Specific Contract Doctrines 
Let us begin the application of the Hand formula to specific 
contract doctrines by applying it to a doctrine that will easily 
illustrate how the formula would justify the conclusion that an 
actor can be negligent when incorrectly assuming a fact does not 
exist, even though a person of ordinary intelligence would have 
believed there was a 50%-or-less chance of the particular fact 
existing: the contract doctrine relating to intoxication. Contract 
doctrine provides that “[a] person incurs only voidable contractual 
duties by entering into a transaction if the other party has reason to 
know that by reason of intoxication (a) he is unable to understand 
in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the 
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transaction, or (b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in 
relation to the transaction.”153  
Assume that a person who manifests assent to a face-to-face 
bargain is so intoxicated that he is unable to understand in a 
reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the deal. The 
non-intoxicated party knows that the other party is intoxicated, but 
based on the information the non-intoxicated party has, a person in 
the non-intoxicated party’s position would believe the likelihood 
the intoxicated person is so intoxicated that he is unable to 
understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of 
the proposed deal is just 25%. Although there is no need to 
immediately reach a deal, the non-intoxicated party manifests 
assent on the spot and she later seeks to enforce the contract, 
despite having no tangible reliance. In response, the intoxicated 
party argues that the contract is voidable because the non-
intoxicated party had reason to know that he was so intoxicated he 
was “unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and 
consequences of the transaction.”154 In reply, the non-intoxicated 
party argues that she did not have reason to know that it was more 
likely than not that the intoxicated party was so intoxicated that he 
was unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and 
consequences of the transaction, and therefore the contract should 
not be voidable. 
Most persons would probably believe that any resulting 
contract should be voidable by the intoxicated party. Applying the 
Hand formula to the “reason to know” standard in the intoxication 
rule produces this result because it shows that the reasonably 
careful person would have waited until the intoxicated person was 
sober before closing the deal.  
The burden of avoiding any loss by ascertaining whether the 
fact existed, i.e., whether the intoxicated party was so intoxicated 
that he was unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature 
and consequences of the transaction, would have involved waiting 
until the next day to confirm whether the now-sober party in fact 
wants to enter into the deal. This burden was slight because there 
was no urgency to forming the contract. Although a loss to the 
non-intoxicated party from not concluding the deal on the spot 
might be not obtaining a contract he desired and thus disappointed 
expectations, the loss is insignificant when one considers that 
contracts should be mutually beneficial, not simply beneficial for 
one party.  
                                                                                                             
 153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 16 (1981) (emphasis added). 
 154. Id. § 16(a). 
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The foreseeable magnitude of loss from the non-intoxicated 
party predicating her action on the belief that the intoxicated party 
is not too intoxicated includes any harm that might be expected 
from a dispute over whether the resulting contract is voidable, and 
imposing on the intoxicated party a duty of performing an 
unintended promise (if the non-intoxicated party is not considered 
negligent, the contract will not be voidable). The foreseeable 
probability of loss was, however, small—just 25%. Importantly, 
though, the likelihood of loss is still enough when multiplied by 
the foreseeable magnitude of loss to outweigh the very small 
burden of waiting another day.  
Accordingly, applying the Hand formula shows that the non-
intoxicated party should be deemed to have had reason to know 
that the intoxicated party was so intoxicated that he did not 
understand the nature and consequences of the proposed 
transaction. The contract should therefore be voidable even though 
the chance of the fact existing was less than 50%. 
The Restatement provides an illustration involving intoxication 
based on a modified version of the well-known case of Lucy v. 
Zehmer.155 Under the illustration, either the offeror was not 
sufficiently intoxicated or, if he was, a person of ordinary 
intelligence would not have believed the chance was substantial 
enough. The illustration provides as follows: 
A has been drinking heavily. B, who has also been drinking, 
meets A, offers to buy A’s farm for $50,000, a fair price, and 
offers A a drink which A accepts. In drunken exhilaration A, as 
a joke, writes out and signs a memorandum of agreement to 
sell, gets his wife to sign it, and delivers it to B, who 
understands the transaction as a serious one. A’s intoxication is 
no defense to B’s suit for specific performance.156 
If, however, A was in fact so intoxicated that he did not understand 
the nature and consequences of the transaction, and there were 
more facts that would have led B to have reason to know that there 
was a substantial chance A was that intoxicated (even if 50% or 
below), the resulting contract should be voidable if the Hand 
formula applies to the “reason to know” standard. And this 
conclusion likely comports with what most persons would believe 
would be a just outcome in such a case.  
In fact, a case involving intoxication discusses the rule in terms 
of a cost-benefit analysis by the person who was not intoxicated. 
                                                                                                             
 155. 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954). 
 156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 16, illus. 3 (1981) (emphasis 
added). 
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The court, discussing a settlement agreement signed by a person 
who was allegedly intoxicated at the time, but who signed it 
outside of the presence of the other party, noted the burden that 
would be placed on the other party if such a release was voidable:  
Under such a proposition, for parties to have any 
confidence in their ability to enforce settlement agreements, 
they would have to take such drastic steps as administering 
a blood test to establish sobriety at the moment of signature 
or agreeing to enter into the waiver agreement before a 
judge who could observe the sobriety of the signing parties. 
Such a rule would place unnecessary burdens on both 
employees and employers who desire to settle their claims 
simply, efficiently, and independently of the courts, and 
undercut many of the goals of the voluntary settlement 
process.157 
Note that the court relied not only on the burden of confirming 
whether the party who signed the release was intoxicated, but also 
on the benefits gained from settling disputes without court 
involvement.  
The next doctrine that will be used to illustrate how the Hand 
formula would apply to contract law is the requirement that the 
formation of a contract include an offer.158 An offer is “the 
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to 
justify another person in understanding that his assent to that 
bargain is invited and will conclude it.”159 The definition of offer 
indirectly incorporates the “reason to believe” standard because a 
manifestation of intention exists when a person “has reason to 
believe that the promisee will infer that intention from his words or 
conduct.”160 It also indirectly incorporates the “reason to know” 
standard because the recipient is not justified in understanding that 
                                                                                                             
 157. Gaub v. Prof. Hosp. Supply, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1131 (D. Idaho 
2012). Thus, the Restatement provides the following illustration: “A, while in a 
state of extreme intoxication, signs and mails a written offer on fair terms to B, 
who has no reason to know of the intoxication. B accepts the offer. A has no 
right to avoid the contract.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 16, illus. 
1 (1981) (emphasis added). 
 158. See Zheng v. City of New York, 940 N.Y.S.2d 582, 586 (App. Div. 
2012) (“To demonstrate the existence of an enforceable agreement, a plaintiff 
must establish an offer . . . .”). 
 159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981). 
 160. Id. § 2 cmt. b. There is no suggestion in the Restatement that this 
standard for “manifestation of intention” would not apply to a “manifestation of 
willingness,” and thus a person would manifest a willingness to enter into a 
bargain when she has reason to believe that the promisee will infer that 
willingness from his words or conduct. 
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his assent to the proposed bargain is invited and will conclude it if 
he has “reason to know” otherwise.161 To demonstrate how the 
Hand formula would apply to offers, cases involving two different 
contexts will be discussed—jokes and preliminary negotiations. 
Lucy v. Zehmer is perhaps the most celebrated case involving 
an alleged joke.162 In Lucy, the plaintiff alleged that he and the 
defendant entered into a contract under which the defendant 
promised to sell his farm to the plaintiff in exchange for the 
plaintiff’s promise to pay the defendant $50,000 (apparently a fair 
price).163 They allegedly entered into the contract at a bar while 
they were drinking alcohol, with the defendant manifesting assent 
by writing the terms of the deal on the back of a restaurant 
check.164 The defendant argued that it had all been a joke, but the 
plaintiff alleged he (the plaintiff) had taken it seriously.165 The 
issue, therefore, was whether, under the objective theory of 
contract, there had been a manifestation of mutual assent.166  
Assuming the defendant was the offeror,167 and applying the 
Restatement’s definition of offer, the issue would be phrased as 
whether the defendant had reason to believe that the plaintiff 
would infer willingness by the defendant to enter into a bargain for 
the sale of the farm.168 Using the Restatement’s “substantial 
chance” or negligence standard, the question would not be whether 
a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would have believed 
it was more likely than not that the defendant was serious, or 
whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would 
have believed that the plaintiff would more likely than not take the 
defendant seriously. Rather, the issue would be whether (1) a 
person of ordinary intelligence in the defendant’s position would 
have believed there was more than a 50% chance the plaintiff 
                                                                                                             
 161. Id. § 26. 
 162. 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954). 
 163. Id. at 517. 
 164. Id. at 517–18.  
 165. Id. at 517–20. 
 166. Id. at 520. 
 167. It is unclear which party was in fact the offeror in Lucy v. Zehmer. The 
court made reference to Lucy being the offeror. See id. at 522 (“Whether the 
writing signed by the defendants and now sought to be enforced by the 
complainants was the result of a serious offer by Lucy and a serious acceptance 
by the defendants, or was a serious offer by Lucy and an acceptance in secret 
jest by the defendants, in either event it constituted a binding contract of sale 
between the parties.”). Arguably, however, there was no offer until Zehmer 
wrote the terms on the back of the restaurant check, and this Article will assume 
that is when an offer was first made, with the preceding events being 
preliminary negotiations. 
 168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. b (1981). 
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would take the defendant seriously or, if not, (2) whether there was 
a substantial-enough chance that a person of ordinary intelligence 
would take the defendant seriously, such that the reasonably 
careful person would have predicated his action based on the 
possibility that the plaintiff would take the defendant seriously.  
Under the Restatement, if the court concludes that a person in 
the defendant’s position would have believed there was more than 
a 50% chance the plaintiff would take the defendant seriously, 
there was a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain. 
The plaintiff’s acceptance would therefore form a contract because 
if there was such a manifestation, the plaintiff was justified in 
assuming that “his assent to that bargain is invited and will 
conclude it.”169 In such a case, the defendant, to avoid liability, 
would have to demonstrate that the contract was voidable, perhaps 
under the doctrine of unilateral mistake.170  
If, however, a person in the defendant’s position would not 
have believed there was more than a 50% chance the plaintiff 
would take the defendant seriously, the Hand formula would apply 
to determine if there was a substantial-enough chance the plaintiff 
would take the defendant seriously, such that the defendant acted 
negligently. The foreseeable probability of loss is based on the 
probability that the plaintiff would take the defendant seriously. 
Let us assume that the foreseeable probability was high, but not 
more than 50% because otherwise the Hand formula would not be 
used, say exactly 50%. This might not be too far from the 
foreseeable probability in the actual case because many facts 
suggested the defendant was not serious—the location (a bar), the 
alcohol (both were drinking), and using the back of a restaurant 
check to make the alleged offer171—and many facts suggested the 
defendant was, in fact, serious—no laughing (as far as we know), 
putting the deal into writing (albeit on the back of a restaurant 
check), the discussion lasting around thirty to forty minutes, and an 
apparently fair price.172 
The foreseeable magnitude of the loss relates to the reliance 
that could have been expected from the plaintiff relying on the 
                                                                                                             
 169. Id. § 24. 
 170. See id. § 153 (“Where a mistake of one party at the time a contract was 
made as to a basic assumption on which he made the contract has a material 
effect on the agreed exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the 
contract is voidable by him if he does not bear the risk of the mistake . . . and (a) 
the effect of the mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be 
unconscionable, or (b) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his 
fault caused the mistake.”). 
 171. Lucy, 84 S.E.2d at 518–20. 
 172. Id. at 517–18. 
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apparent offer, both in terms of disappointed expectations and 
wasted, tangible reliance. Here, the expected magnitude of loss 
was likely small. The type of foreseeable, tangible reliance was 
probably limited to the plaintiff determining whether there was 
satisfactory title and raising the $50,000 (which the plaintiff would 
retain if the defendant refused to go through with the deal).173 The 
foreseeable magnitude of loss must also take into account the 
possibility that the defendant will realize that the plaintiff has taken 
him seriously before he (the plaintiff) tangibly relies on the apparent 
deal, thus enabling the defendant to avoid this particular type of loss—
wasted, tangible reliance by the plaintiff—before it occurs. Such a 
realization before tangible reliance would also reduce, though not 
eliminate, the harm from disappointed expectations—the sooner one 
learns the truth the less disappointment, presumably—and the chance 
of a dispute between the parties over whether a contract was formed—
the plaintiff might take the position of “no harm, no foul.” In Lucy, the 
chance of this happening was high because the parties were 
negotiating face to face, and the defendant would have the opportunity 
to clear up any misunderstanding if it became apparent to the 
defendant before the plaintiff left the bar and started relying on the 
deal. And the likelihood the defendant would recognize that the 
plaintiff had taken it seriously—before the plaintiff left the bar—
was high because jokes usually do not end on a serious note. 
In fact, this is exactly what the defendant alleged happened. 
The defendant alleged that as soon as he realized the plaintiff had 
taken the intended joke seriously, he told the plaintiff, “Hell no, that is 
beer and liquor talking. I am not going to sell you the farm. I have told 
you that too many times before.”174 This case thus fits within 
Professor P.S. Atiyah’s observation that “[f]requently, a promise-
based claim is based on relatively short-lived expectations; for it is 
where the promisor has (for instance) made some mistake, or 
overlooked some fact, that he is most likely to attempt to withdraw his 
promise.”175 And because the trial court ruled in the defendant’s favor, 
the appellate court was required to accept the defendant’s testimony 
as true unless it was clearly against the evidence, something often 
overlooked in discussions about the case.176 Although considering 
                                                                                                             
 173. The plaintiff’s duty to proceed with the sale was conditioned on title 
being satisfactory to him. See id. at 517 (noting that the alleged contract stated, 
“We hereby agree to sell to W. O. Lucy the Ferguson Farm complete for 
$50,000.00, title satisfactory to buyer”). 
 174. Id. at 519. 
 175. See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 4 
(1979). 
 176. Although all of the testimony in Lucy was by deposition, see 84 S.E.2d 
at 518, a trial court’s factual findings in such a case are still presumed to be 
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that such after-the-promise events would be inappropriate in a 
Hand formula analysis, which focuses on what was foreseeable at 
the time of action, these facts show how the communication’s 
context—face-to-face discussions—reduces the foreseeable 
magnitude of loss. Thus, the foreseeable magnitude of loss was 
actually quite small in Lucy. Accordingly, P multiplied by L does 
not seem to be very high, even if P is 50%.  
 The defendant’s burden to avoid the misunderstanding 
involved him making it clear that it was all in jest before the 
plaintiff manifested assent. In one respect, this would seem to be 
minimal. All the defendant had to do was not joke around about 
selling the farm, particularly for as long as thirty to forty minutes, 
or make it clear it was all a joke before putting it in writing. There 
would, however, be some burden imposed on the defendant if he 
was expected to put an end to the joke sooner. There is surely a 
societal benefit to joking, and requiring someone in the defendant’s 
position to make it clear that he is only joking usually decreases 
the benefit gained from joking around. Thus, B is perhaps more 
difficult to determine than PL.  
As a result, whether B is in fact less than PL is debatable. But 
the Hand formula does not, of course, always provide a 
determinative answer to the question of whether a person acted 
negligently. It does, however, focus the inquiry on those factors 
that are often most relevant. Applying the Hand formula to Lucy v. 
Zehmer might not provide a clear answer to whether the defendant 
was negligent, but it identifies the types of questions that should be 
asked, and makes relevant the kinds of factors intuitively 
considered relevant, such as the likelihood of loss from joking 
around and the benefits of such behavior, which would not 
ordinarily be considered relevant in a contract-law analysis. 
Another well-known contracts case involving an alleged joke is 
Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc.177 In Leonard, PepsiCo ran a television 
commercial to advertise its Pepsi Points program, under which 
consumers could trade Pepsi Points for various products, such as a 
jacket tattoo and a mountain bike.178 Pepsi Points could be 
obtained either by purchasing Pepsi drinks or by paying ten cents 
                                                                                                             
 
correct. See Ashby v. Dumouchelle, 40 S.E.2d 493, 496 (Va. 1946) (“While a 
decree based upon depositions is not as strong and conclusive as one based on 
evidence heard ore tenus, it is presumptively correct, and cannot be disturbed if 
it is reasonably supported or sustained by substantial, competent, and credible 
evidence. In other words, the evidence must be clearly against the findings in 
order to justify a reversal.”). 
 177. 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 178. Id. at 118–19. 
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per point.179 At the end of the commercial, a high-school student 
lands a military jet on school grounds, and the following words 
appear at the bottom of the screen: “HARRIER FIGHTER 
7,000,000 PEPSI POINTS.”180 The plaintiff, who was “young,”181 
sent a check to buy enough Pepsi Points to get the jet, but PepsiCo 
refused to provide it, explaining that the commercial’s reference to 
obtaining it was just a joke.182 The plaintiff then sued PepsiCo for 
breach of contract,183 and the trial court entered summary judgment 
in PepsiCo’s favor.184 The appellate court affirmed in a brief 
opinion.185 
Assuming that a person in PepsiCo’s position would not have 
believed there was a greater-than-50% chance someone young like 
the plaintiff (PepsiCo was obviously targeting young persons) 
would have taken the commercial’s reference to a Harrier jet 
seriously, applying the Hand formula confirms that the trial court’s 
decision was correct. Even if the likelihood of loss was high 
because many younger viewers would take the commercial’s 
reference to a Harrier jet seriously (a debatable assumption), the 
foreseeable magnitude of loss was likely quite small. The 
likelihood a younger viewer would in fact take it seriously, then set 
out to obtain enough Pepsi Points, and then actually obtain enough 
to get the jet is surely very low, particularly because younger 
viewers were not likely to have the money to buy enough Pepsi 
Points for the jet.  
Also, a person who sent in a check seeking to buy that many 
Pepsi Points to purchase the Harrier jet would be met with a letter 
from PepsiCo returning the check and explaining it was all a joke, 
which, of course, is exactly what happened. Although a person 
might buy a lot of Pepsi drinks to obtain Pepsi Points (though 
certainly not enough to get seven million points), the person would 
in fact have the Pepsi to drink. One would certainly not expect 
someone to take any other actions in the expectation of obtaining a 
Harrier jet, such as building a runway, and would particularly not 
expect this of the targeted audience of young people. Note that 
under a traditional contract-law analysis, the foreseeable 
magnitude of the loss would be irrelevant, but in Leonard, the fact 
that the foreseeable magnitude of loss is very slight seems 
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 185. See Leonard v. PepsiCo, Inc., 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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intuitively relevant to reaching a just result. Thus, PL is likely very 
low in Leonard, even if P is somewhat high. 
In contrast, the burden on PepsiCo is perhaps considerable. The 
commercial’s use of the Harrier jet created an image that persons 
who used Pepsi products are “cool.” As recognized by the trial 
judge: 
[T]he commercial suggests, as commercials often do, that 
use of the advertised product will transform what, for most 
youth, can be a fairly routine and ordinary experience. The 
military tattoo and stirring martial music, as well as the use 
of subtitles in a Courier font that scroll terse messages 
across the screen, such as “MONDAY 7:58 AM,” evoke 
military and espionage thrillers. The implication of the 
commercial is that Pepsi Stuff merchandise will inject 
drama and moment into hitherto unexceptional lives. The 
commercial in this case thus makes the exaggerated claims 
similar to those of many television advertisements: that by 
consuming the featured clothing, car, beer, or potato chips, 
one will become attractive, stylish, desirable, and admired 
by all.186 
To hold PepsiCo liable would mean that it and other advertisers 
would have to include a disclaimer making it clear in the 
advertisement that the jet’s availability was just a joke, detracting 
from the commercial’s impact. Arguably, however, such a burden 
is not as substantial as the burden in a case like Lucy v. Zehmer 
because more time is put into advertisements than a barroom 
conversation over drinks. In any event, B would seem to be higher 
than PL, and the Hand formula supports the court’s conclusion in 
Leonard, which is that there was no offer. 
 Next, consider the issue of preliminary negotiations. The rule is 
that “[a] manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain is not 
an offer if the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason 
to know that the person making it does not intend to conclude a 
bargain until he has made a further manifestation of assent.”187 
Assume a case in which an apparent offer has been made during 
negotiations—that is, the alleged offeror has manifested a 
willingness to enter into a bargain—and a person of ordinary 
intelligence in the position of the recipient would believe there is a 
less-than-50% chance that the alleged offeror only intends to 
conclude a bargain upon making a further manifestation of assent. 
Assume further that the alleged offeror does not, in fact, intend to 
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conclude a bargain until making a further manifestation of assent. 
To determine whether the chance is substantial enough, the Hand 
formula would be applied. And to see how it would apply, the 
well-known case of PFT Roberson, Inc. v. Volvo Trucks North 
America, Inc. will be used.188  
In PFT Roberson, the plaintiff, which operated a fleet of long-
haul trucks and trailers, and the defendant, a truck manufacturer, 
began negotiations with the goal of entering into a fleet agreement, 
which is a comprehensive contract providing for the supply and 
maintenance of trucks, and the defendant thus manifested a 
willingness to enter into a bargain.189 Many draft agreements were 
exchanged but none was signed.190 Ultimately, the plaintiff sued 
the defendant for breach of contract, asserting the parties reached a 
binding agreement on certain items in an email in which the 
defendant identified those particular items the parties had “come to 
agreement on.”191  
Assuming a person in the plaintiff’s position would believe 
there was a less-than-50% chance that the defendant intended to 
conclude a bargain on those items only upon a further 
manifestation of assent, the Hand formula would apply to 
determine if the chance was substantial enough. The foreseeable 
likelihood of loss depends upon how likely it was that the 
defendant did not intend to reach a deal until the parties had 
reached an agreement on all of the terms under discussion. This 
chance was likely high, even if it was not greater than 50%. 
Sophisticated parties usually do not intend to conclude a deal 
piecemeal and by email. The foreseeable magnitude of loss of the 
plaintiff predicating its action on the belief the defendant intended 
to conclude a deal at that time was also high because it could result 
in wasted reliance expenditures by the plaintiff and foregone 
opportunities; cause transaction costs disputing whether a contract 
was formed; and potentially bind the defendant to a contract it did 
not intend to enter into. Also, as the court recognized, permitting a 
contract to be concluded when there is doubt as to whether the 
parties are still in preliminary negotiations comes with a future 
cost: 
Often the parties agree on some items . . . while others . . . 
require more negotiation. If any sign of agreement on any 
issue exposed the parties to a risk that a judge would deem 
the first-resolved items to be stand-alone contracts, the 
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process of negotiation would be more cumbersome (the 
parties would have to hedge every sentence with cautionary 
legalese), and these extra negotiating expenses would raise 
the effective price (for in a competitive market the buyer 
must cover all of the seller’s costs).192  
In contrast, the burden on the plaintiff is slight because the 
plaintiff easily could have obtained clarification as to whether the 
defendant, by its email, intended to conclude a deal on the terms 
upon which the parties had already reached an agreement. 
Accordingly, in the typical case in which the issue is whether the 
parties have formed a contract or are still engaging in preliminary 
negotiations, the burden of confirming whether a contract has been 
reached will often be less than the foreseeable likelihood of loss 
and the foreseeable magnitude of loss.193 
Next, consider the issue of an acceptance. The “reason to 
believe” standard applies indirectly to the issue of whether an 
acceptance has been made because an acceptance “is a 
manifestation of assent to the terms [of the offer] made by the 
offeree in a manner invited or required by the offer.”194 To show 
how the Hand formula would apply to the issue of whether an 
acceptance was made, the well-known case of Embry v. 
Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co. will be used.195 
In Embry, the plaintiff employee alleged that in response to 
him telling the president of the defendant employer on December 
23 that he only had until January 1 to find other employment and 
would quit then and there unless given a one-year contract, the 
president responded, “Go ahead, you’re all right. Get your men 
                                                                                                             
 192. Id. at 731. 
 193. The Restatement’s preliminary negotiations rule, which makes it 
difficult to form an agreement because the “substantial chance” or negligence 
standard applies to the offeree having reason to know the offeror did not intend 
to conclude a deal until a further manifestation of assent, also applies to 
advertisements. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 26 cmt. b 
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suggested bargains may be stated in some detail.”); id. § 26, illus. 1 (“A, a 
clothing merchant, advertises overcoats of a certain kind for sale at $50. This is 
not an offer, but an invitation to the public to come and purchase.” (emphasis 
added)). Whether advertisements should be treated under a separate rule that 
uses the “reason to know” standard differently is an interesting policy question, 
but is beyond the scope of this Article, which accepts the Restatement rules as 
adopted. 
 194. Id. § 50(1) (emphasis added). 
 195. 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907). 
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out, and don’t let that worry you.”196 The plaintiff alleged that the 
president’s response constituted an acceptance of the plaintiff’s 
offer of reemployment for one year.197 
Assuming that a person in the president’s position would have 
believed there was less than a 50% chance that the plaintiff would 
construe his response as an acceptance, the Hand formula would 
apply to determine if the president had reason to believe that the 
plaintiff would construe his response as assent to the plaintiff’s 
offer. The foreseeable likelihood of loss depends on how likely it 
was that the plaintiff would construe the response as assent. In this 
situation, it appears that the likelihood would be high because the 
language suggests assent.  
The foreseeable magnitude of loss is high because the plaintiff 
told the president that if he was not reemployed by January 1, he 
would lose the opportunity to find alternative employment. 
Accordingly, the foreseeable magnitude of loss from the president 
predicating his action on the belief that the plaintiff would not 
construe his planned response as an acceptance—and thus not 
being more clear in his language—is the plaintiff being left 
unemployed, perhaps for close to a year, depending on when the 
defendant terminates the plaintiff. Also, because the president was 
the offeree, there would not be as much of an opportunity to avoid 
the tangible harm as there would be if the president was the 
offeror, because one would not necessarily expect a response from 
the plaintiff that made it clear how the plaintiff understood the 
defendant’s response. This is particularly true because the 
president told the plaintiff to get back to work, indicating the 
discussion was over. Also, if the misunderstanding was not cleared 
up in a little over a week (by January 1), the tangible harm would 
be done. 
The burden on the president to avoid the loss would have been 
small because he easily could have used language that was 
unambiguous, and unlike Lucy and Leonard, there is no benefit to 
being unclear in this situation. Accordingly, the burden is less than 
the foreseeable likelihood of loss multiplied by the foreseeable 
magnitude of loss, and the president therefore had reason to 
believe his response would be construed as an acceptance. 
The above cases provide just a few examples of how the Hand 
formula would apply to contract rules incorporating the “reason to 
know” and “reason to believe” standard. These examples 
demonstrate, however, that even though the Hand formula often 
does not provide determinative results, application of the three 
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factors focuses attention on facts intuitively considered relevant to 
such issues. The same type of analysis could be used for any of the 
Restatement rules incorporating the “reason to know” and “reason to 
believe” standard, and doing so will provide for greater consistency 
within the rules of contract law.  
CONCLUSION 
Contract law is largely a law of negligence, yet the applicable 
standard of care expected of parties has not been well defined. The 
Restatement implements a negligence standard primarily—though 
not exclusively—through the use of a “reason to know” and 
“reason to believe” standard in many of its black letter rules. The 
Restatement, however, provides little guidance regarding applying 
this standard, other than indicating that it is a negligence standard. 
If this is so, negligence law’s Hand formula should be used to 
determine when a party had “reason to know” or “reason to 
believe” something. The Hand formula is the accepted method for 
determining whether a person is negligent under tort law, and its 
utilitarian approach is arguably more suited for contract law than 
tort law, because of the former’s emphasis on exchange. The Hand 
formula also uses factors that intuitively seem relevant to resolving 
contract law issues, but which have traditionally been considered 
irrelevant under contract law. And by adopting the Hand formula 
as the test for when a party has “reason to know” or “reason to 
believe” a fact under contract law, a vague standard will be given 
greater clarity. 
